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Abstract
The design of the best economic mechanism for Spon-
sored Search Auctions (SSAs) is a central task in com-
putational mechanism design/game theory. Two open
questions concern the adoption of user models more
accurate than that one currently used and the choice
between Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) and
Vickrey–Clark–Groves mechanism (VCG). In this pa-
per, we provide some contributions to answer these
questions. We study Price of Anarchy (PoA) and Price
of Stability (PoS) over social welfare and auctioneer’s
revenue of GSP w.r.t. the VCG when the users follow
the famous cascade model. Furthermore, we provide
exact, randomized, and approximate algorithms, show-
ing that in real–world settings (Yahoo! Webscope A3
dataset, 10 available slots) optimal allocations can be
found in less than 1s with up to 1,000 ads, and can be
approximated in less than 20ms even with more than
1,000 ads with an average accuracy greater than 99%.
Introduction
SSAs, in which a number of advertisers bid to have their
ads displayed in some slot alongside the search results of a
keyword, constitute one of the most successful applications
of microeconomic mechanisms, with a revenue of about $50
billion dollars in the US alone in 2014 (IAB 2015). Similar
models are used in many other advertisement applications,
e.g. contextual advertising (Varian and Harris 2014). A num-
ber of questions remain currently open in the study of effec-
tive SSAs. Among these, two are crucial and concern the
adoption of the best user model in real–world settings and
the design of the best economic mechanism. In this paper,
we provide some contributions to answer these questions.
The commonly adopted user model is the position de-
pendent cascade (PDC) in which the user is assumed to
observe the slots from the top to the bottom with prob-
abilities to observe the next slot that depend only on the
slots themselves (Narahari et al. 2009). The optimal alloca-
tion can be efficiently found in a greedy fashion. The natu-
ral extension is the ad/position–dependent cascade (APDC)
model, in which the probability to observe the next slot
depends also on the ads actually allocated. This model is
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extensively experimentally validated (Craswell et al. 2008;
Joachims et al. 2007). However, it is not known whether
finding the best allocation of APDC is FNP–hard, but it
is commonly conjectured to be. (Gatti and Rocco 2013)
provides an exact algorithm that can be used in real time
only with 40 ads or less, while in real–world applications
the ads can be even more than 1,000. The problem admits
a constant–ratio (1 − )/4, with  ∈ [0, 1], approxima-
tion algorithm (Gatti and Rocco 2013; Kempe and Mahdian
2008), but no known algorithm is proved to lead to a truth-
ful economic mechanism. In addition, the known approx-
imation algorithms can be applied in real time only with
100 ads or less (Gatti and Rocco 2013). More expressive
models include a contextual graph, see (Gatti et al. 2015;
Fotakis, Krysta, and Telelis 2011), but they are Poly–APX–
hard. Hence, the APDC is considered as the candidate pro-
viding the best trade–off between accuracy and tractability.
While the GSP is still popular in many SSAs, the in-
creasing evidence of its limits is strongly pushing towards
the adoption of the more appealing VCG mechanism, which
is already successfully employed in the related scenario of
contextual advertising, by Google (Varian and Harris 2014)
and Facebook (Hegeman 2010). The main drawback of the
GSP is the inefficiency of its equilibria (in terms of so-
cial welfare) w.r.t. the VCG outcome (the only known re-
sults concern PDC): considering the whole set of Nash
equilibria in full information, the PoA of the GSP is up-
per bounded by about 1.6, while considering the set of
Bayes–Nash equilibria the PoA is upper bounded by about
3.1 (Leme and E. Tardos 2010). Furthermore, automated
bidding strategies, used in practice by the advertisers to find
their best bids, may not even converge to any Nash equi-
librium and, under mild assumptions, the states they con-
verge to are shown to be arbitrarily inefficient (Evange-
los and Telelis 2010). Some works study how inefficiency
is affected by some form of externalities, showing that no
Nash equilibrium of the GSP provides a larger revenue
than the VCG outcome (Kuminov and Tennenholtz 2009;
Gomes, Immorlica, and Markakis 2009).
Original contributions. Under the assumption that the
users behave as prescribed by APDC, we study the PoA and
PoS both over the social welfare and over the auctioneer’s
revenue of the GSP w.r.t. the VCG based on APDC (we
study also the restricted case in which the advertisers do
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not overbid). We extend our analysis done for the GSP to
the VCG based on PDC. Both analyses show a wide disper-
sion of the equilibria with PoAs in most cases unbounded,
pointing out the limits of the traditional models. Further-
more, we provide a polynomial–time algorithm that dramat-
ically shrinks auctions instances, safely discarding ads (even
more than 90% in our experiments). We also provide a ran-
domized algorithm (that can be derandomized with polyno-
mial cost) finding optimal allocations with probability 0.5
in real–world instances (based on the Yahoo! Webscope A3
dataset) with up to 1,000 ads and 10 slots in less than 1s and
a maximal–in–its–range (therefore leading to truthful mech-
anisms if paired with VCG–like payments) approximation
algorithm returning allocations with an average approxima-
tion ratio larger than about 0.99 in less than 20ms even with
1,000 ads. This shows that the APDC can be effectively used
in practice also in large instances. Finally, we prove our ap-
proximation algorithm to have a ratio of 1/2 in restricted
settings. However, in general settings the proof keeps to be
elusive (even if we did not find any instance in which the
approximation ratio is below 1/2).
Problem formulation
We adopt the same SSA model used in (Gatti and Rocco
2013) with minor variations. The model without externali-
ties is composed of the following elements:
• A = {1, . . . , N} is the set of ads. W.l.o.g. we assume
each advertiser (also called agent) to have a single ad, so
each agent a ∈ A can be identified with ad a;
• K = {1, . . . ,K} is the set of slots s ordered from the top
to the bottom. We assume w.l.o.g. K ≤ N ;
• qa ∈ [0, 1] is the quality of ad a (i.e., the probability a user
will click ad a once observed);
• va ∈ Va ⊆ R+ is the value for agent a when ad a is
clicked by a user, while v = (v1, . . . , vN ) is the value
profile;
• v¯a is the product of qa and va, and can be interpreted as
the expected fraction of the ad value that is actually ab-
sorbed by the users observing ad a;
• vˆa ∈ Vˆa ⊆ R+ is the value reported by agent a, while
vˆ = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆN ) is the reported value profile;
• Θ is the set of (ordered) allocations of ads to slots, where
each ad cannot be allocated in more than one slot.
Given an allocation θ of ads to slots, we let:
• ads(θ) ⊆ A to denote the subset of ads allocated in θ;
• slotθ(a) to denote the slot in which ad a is allocated, if
any;
• adθ(s) to denote the ad allocated in slot s.
The externalities introduced by the cascade model assume
the user to have a Markovian behavior, starting to observe
the slots from the first (i.e., slot 1) to the last (i.e., slot K)
where the transition probability from slot s to slot s+ 1 is
given by the product of two parameters:
• (ad–dependent externalities) ca ∈ [0, 1] is the continua-
tion probability of ad a;
• (position–dependent externalities) λs ∈ [0, 1] is the fac-
torized prominence of slot s (it is assumed λK = 0).
The click through rate CTRθ(a) ∈ [0, 1] of ad a in al-
location θ is the probability a user will click ad a and it is
formally defined as
CTRθ(a) = qa · Λslotθ(a) · Cθ(a),
where
Cθ(a) =
∏
s< slotθ(a)
cadθ(s),
Λs =
∏
k< s
λk.
Parameter Λs is commonly called prominence (Kempe and
Mahdian 2008).
Given an allocation θ, its social welfare is defined as:
SW(θ) =
∑
ads(θ)
va · CTRθ(a) =
∑
ads(θ)
v¯a · Λslotθ(a) · Cθ(a).
The problem we study is the design of an economic mech-
anismM, composed of
• an allocation function f : ×a∈AVi → Θ and
• a payment function for each agent a, pa : ×a∈AVˆa → R.
Each agent a has a linear utility ua(va, vˆ) = va ·
CTRf(v)(a)−pa(vˆ), in expectation over the clicks and pays
pa(vˆ)/CTRf(vˆ)(a) only once its ad is clicked. We are inter-
ested in mechanisms satisfying the following properties:
Definition 1. MechanismM is dominant strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC) if reporting true values is a dominant
strategy for every agent (i.e., vˆa = va).
Definition 2. MechanismM is individually rational (IR) if
no agent acting truthfully prefers to abstain from participat-
ing to the mechanism rather than participating.
Definition 3. Mechanism M is weakly budget balance
(WBB) if the mechanism is never in deficit.
Definition 4. Mechanism M is computationally tractable
when both f and pa are computable in polynomial time.
Definition 5. Allocation function f is maximal in its range
if f returns an allocation maximizing the social welfare
among a given subset of allocations that is independent of
the agents’ reports.
When f is maximal in its range, VCG–like payments can
be used, obtaining a DSIC, IR and WBB mechanism (Nisan
and Ronen 2000).
Inefficiency of GSP and VCG with PDC
GSP analysis
In the GSP, ads are allocated according to decreasing re-
ported values: supposing vˆ1 ≥ · · · ≥ vˆN , the allocation
function maps ad a to slot s = a, for each a = 1, . . . ,K.
Every agent a = 1, . . . ,K − 1 is charged a price pa =
qa+1vˆa+1. AgentK is charged a price pK = 0 ifK = N , or
pK = qK+1vˆK+1 otherwise. The following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. The GSP is not IR, when users follow the APDC.
The GSP is well known not to be DSIC. For this reason,
we study the inefficiency of its Nash equilibria.
Lemma 2. The PoA of the social welfare in the GSP when
users follow APDC is unbounded.
Lemma 3. The PoA of the social welfare in the GSP when
users follow APDC is ≥ K, in the restricted case the agents
do not overbid.
Lemma 4. The PoA of the revenue in the GSP when users
follow APDC is unbounded (even without overbidding).
Lemma 5. The PoS of the social welfare in the GSP when
users follow APDC is 1 (even without overbidding).
Lemma 6. The PoS of the revenue in the GSP when users
follow APDC is 0 (even without overbidding).
Proofs of the previous lemmas can be found in the Ap-
pendix . Lemma 2 and 3 together show a huge dispersion
of the social welfare of the allocations associated with GSP
equilibria: it may be arbitrarily larger than the social welfare
of the APDC. Lemma 4 and 6 show that this situation gets
even worse when we turn our attention onto the auctioneer’s
revenue, with the revenue of GSP equilibria being arbitrarily
smaller or larger than that of the APDC.
VCG with PDC analysis
The PDC model is very similar to the APDC: the difference
lies in the fact that ca = 1 for each ad a ∈ A. Payments are
calculated according to the rules attaining the VCG mech-
anism, thus providing a IR, WBB, DSIC mechanism under
the assumption that users experience ad fatigue due only to
the positions of the slots and not to the allocated ads. When
the user’s behavior is affected by ad continuation probabili-
ties, the above mentioned properties do not necessarily apply
anymore. Indeed, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 7. The VCG with PDC is neither IR nor DSIC,
when users follow APDC.
We study the inefficiency of Nash equilibria, VCG with
PDC not being truthful.
Lemma 8. The PoA of the social welfare in the VCG with
PDC when users follow APDC is unbounded.
Lemma 9. The PoA of the social welfare in the VCG with
PDC when users follow APDC is≥ K, in the restricted case
the agents do not overbid.
Lemma 10. The PoA of the revenue in the VCG with PDC
when users follow APDC is unbounded (even without over-
bidding).
Lemma 11. The PoS of the social welfare in the VCG with
PDC when users follow APDC is 1.
Lemma 12. The PoS of the revenue in the VCG with PDC
when users follow APDC is 0.
Lemma 13. The PoS of the revenue in the VCG with PDC
when users follow APDC is ≤ 1, in the restricted case the
agents do not overbid.
Proofs of the previous lemmas can be found in the Ap-
pendix . Again, we see a huge dispersion, both in terms of
social welfare and of revenue, among the different equilibria
of VCG with PDC.
Algorithms
DOMINATED–ADS algorithm
We present an algorithm meant to reduce the size of the
problem (i.e., the number of ads), without any loss in terms
of social welfare or revenue of the optimal allocation. The
central observation for our algorithm is that, under certain
circumstances, given two ads a, b with parameters (v¯a, ca)
and (v¯b, cb) respectively, it is possible to establish a priori
that, if in an optimal allocation b is allocated to a slot, then
ad a is allocated in a slot preceding that of b; whenever this
is the case we say that ad a “dominates” ad b. As an ex-
ample, consider two ads a and b, satisfying the condition
(v¯a > v¯b) ∧ (ca > cb): in accordance with intuition, a sim-
ple exchange argument shows that a dominates b. A weaker
sufficient condition for deciding whether a dominates b is
given in the following lemma and proved in the Appendix .
Lemma 14. Let λmax = max{λs : s ∈ K}, and B an
upper bound1 of the value of the optimal allocation; also,
let D = [0, λmax] × [0, B]. Given two ads a, b with pa-
rameters (v¯a, ca) and (v¯b, cb), consider the affine function
wa,b : D → R, defined as
wa,b(x, y) = det
(
x −y 1
1 v¯b cb
1 v¯a ca
)
If the minimum of wa,b overD is greater than 0, then a dom-
inates b.
We will use the notation a ≺ b to denote that ad a domi-
nates ad b, in the sense of Lemma 14. Note that ≺ defines a
partial order over the set of ads. Since wa,b is an affine func-
tion defined on a convex set, it must attain a minimum on
one of the corner points of D, hence the following holds:
Lemma 15. If the four numbers wa,b(0, 0), wa,b(0, B),
wa,b(λmax, 0), wa,b(λmax, B) are all positive, then a ≺ b.
We define the dominators of an ad a as the set dom(a) =
{b ∈ A : b ≺ a}. The following lemma is central to our al-
gorithm, as it expresses a sufficient condition for discarding
an ad from the problem:
Lemma 16. If |dom(a)| ≥ K, then ad a can be discarded,
as it will never be chosen for an allocation.
This suggests a straightforward algorithm to determine
the set of safely deletable ads, as streamlined in Algo-
rithm 1. In the Appendix we show two methods, respec-
tively named CONST–λ and DECOUPLE, for calculating a
1 More precisely, it is enough that B is a (weak) upper bound
of the quantity
B˜ = max
i
{λi · ALLOC(i+ 1,K)},
where ALLOC(i,K) is the value of the optimal allocation of the
problem having as slots the set Ki = {i, . . . ,K} ⊆ K.
Algorithm 1 DOMINATED–ADS
1: procedure DOMINATED–ADS(ads, slots)
2: Determine D, as defined in Lemma 14
3: For each ad a, compute |dom(a)|
4: Discard all ads a having |dom(a)| ≥ K
“good” upper bound B that is needed in Line 2 in order to
determine D. The first method (CONST–λ) has a computa-
tional complexity ofO(NK) time, while DECOUPLE runs in
O(N +K logK) time and makes use of the FFT algorithm
(Cooley and Tukey 1965). Both methods require linear, i.e.
O(N + K) = O(N) memory. Of course, when K is small
enough, both algorithms can be run and the smallest upper
bound can be taken as the value of B.
A naı¨ve implementation of Line 3 tests every ad a against
all the other ads, keeping track of the number of domina-
tors of a. This leads to an easily implementable O(N2) al-
gorithm suitable for instances with ≈ 1,000 ads, but is not
applicable in real time when N grows. In the Appendix we
show that it is possible to compute the number of dominators
of an ad a in O(logN) amortized time using the dynamic
fractional cascading technique (Mehlhorn and Na¨her 1990).
Hence, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 17. The DOMINATED–ADS algorithm runs in
O(N logN) or O(N(K + logN)) time, depending on the
employed upper bounding strategy, and O(N) memory.
Finally notice that iterating the algorithm could lead to
successive simplifications of the ads set, as the upper bound
B provided by CONST–λ and DECOUPLE may decrease in
successive runs of DOMINATED–ADS. However, the maxi-
mum number of iterations is N , since, if no ad has been
discarded, then B does not change and no further ad can be
discarded in future iterations.
COLORED–ADS algorithm
We present an algorithm that can determine an optimal al-
location in time polynomial in N and exponential in K. As
the number of slots is generally small (typically ≤ 10), this
algorithm is suitable for real–world applications. The key
insight for the algorithm is that the problem of finding the
allocation maximizing the social welfare can be cast to an
instance of the well–known problem of finding a maximal
K–vertex weighted simple path in an un undirected graph.
Efficient algorithms for the latter problem can therefore be
used to solve our problem.
We introduce the definition of a right–aligned allocation.
Definition 6. Given an ordered sequence S : a1, . . . , an
of ads, we say that the right–aligned allocation of S is the
allocation mapping the ads in S to the last n slots, in order,
leaving the first K − n+ 1 slots vacant.
Consider the complete undirected graph G having the
available ads for vertices; every simple path pi : a1, . . . , an
of length n ≤ K in G can be uniquely mapped to the right–
aligned allocation of pi, and vice versa. Following this corre-
spondence, we define the value of a simple path in G as the
value of the corresponding right–aligned allocation. In order
to prove that the problem of finding a maximal K–vertex
weighted simple path in G is equivalent to that of finding an
optimal allocation, it is sufficient to prove that there exists
(at least) one optimal allocation leaving no slot vacant, i.e.
using all of the K slots. To this end we introduce the follow-
ing lemma, whose proof is in the Appendix .
Lemma 18. In at least one optimal allocation all the avail-
able slots are allocated.
The problem of finding a maximal K–vertex weighted
simple path in G can be solved by means of the color coding
technique (Alon, Yuster, and Zwick 1994). The basic idea is
as follows: in a single iteration, vertices are assigned one of
K random colors; then, the best path visiting every color ex-
actly once is found using a dynamic programming approach;
finally, this loop is repeated a certain amount of times, de-
pending on the type of algorithm (randomized or derandom-
ized). In the randomized version, the probability of having
missed the bestK–path decreases as e−R/e
K
, whereR is the
number of iterations. Therefore, using randomization, we
can implement aO((2e)KN) compute time andO(2K+N)
memory space algorithm, as streamlined in Algorithm 2. In
the derandomized version, the algorithm is exact and re-
quires O((2e)KKO(logK)N logN) time when paired with
the derandomization technique presented in (Naor, Schul-
man, and Srinivasan 1995).
Algorithm 2 COLORED–ADS
1: procedure COLORED-ADS(ads, slots)
2: repeat eK log 2 times . 50% success probability
3: Assign random colors ∈ {1, . . . ,K} to G’s vertices
note: each color must be used at least once
. We now construct a memoization table MEMO[C], reporting,
for each color subset C of {1, . . . ,K} the maximum value of
any simple path visiting colors in C exactly once.
4: MEMO[∅]← 0
5: P ← powerset of {1, . . . ,K}, sorted by set size
6: for C ∈ P − {∅}, in order do
7: λ˜← λK−|C|+1
8: for each color c ∈ C do
9: for each vertex (ad) a in G of color c do
10: VALUE ← v¯a + ca λ˜ · MEMO[C − {c}]
11: MEMO[C]← max{MEMO[C], VALUE}
12: return MEMO[{1, . . . ,K}]
Note that Algorithm 2 is just a simplified, randomized and
non–parallelized sketch of the algorithm we test in the ex-
perimental section of this paper; also, for the sake of pre-
sentation, in Algorithm 2 we only return the value of the
optimal allocation and not the allocation itself. We also con-
sidered the idea of using 1.3K different colors, as suggested
by the work of (Hu¨ffner, Wernicke, and Zichner 2008), but
we found out that for this particular problem the improve-
ment is negligible.
We conclude this subsection with some remarks about the
above algorithm. First, we remark that, given the nature of
the operations involved, the algorithm proves to be efficient
in practice, with only a small constant hidden in the big–
oh notation. Furthermore, it is worth to note that the iter-
ations of the main loop (Lines 2 to 15) are independent;
as such, the algorithm scales well horizontally in a parallel
computing environment. Second, we point out an important
economic property of the algorithm, that makes COLORED–
ADS appealing: it allows the design of truthful mechanisms
when paired with VCG–like payments. While this is obvi-
ously true when the algorithm is used in its derandomized
exact form, it can be proven that the truthfulness property
holds true even when only a partial number of iterations of
the main loop is carried out. This easily follows from the
fact that the algorithm is maximal–in–its–range, searching
for the best allocation in a range that does not depend on
the reports of the agent. This implies that it is possible to
interrupt the algorithm after a time limit has been hit, with-
out compromising the truthfulness of the mechanism. This
leads to approximate algorithms that offer convenient time–
approximation trade–offs, as long as K is small. We exper-
imentally investigate the approximation ratio of these algo-
rithms as a function of the number of performed iterations
of the main loop in the Appendix .
SORTED–ADS approximate algorithm
While the general problem of finding an optimal allocation is
difficult, polynomial time algorithms are easy to derive—as
we show below—when we restrict the set of feasible allo-
cations to those respecting a given total order ≺ads defined
on the ads set. This suggests this simple approximation al-
gorithm: first, T total orders ≺ads,1, . . . ,≺ads,T over the ads
set are chosen; then, the optimal allocation satisfying ≺ads,i
is computed, for each i; finally, the value of the optimal allo-
cation for the original unrestricted problem is approximated
with the best allocation found over all the T orders. The
number of total orders T is arbitrary, with more orders obvi-
ously producing higher approximation ratios. An empirical
study on the time–approximation tradeoff curve of SORTED–
ADS is available in the Appendix .
In order to find the optimal allocation respecting the to-
tal order ≺ads, we propose a simple O(NK) time dynamic
programming algorithm, which we name SORTED–ADS, de-
scribed in Algorithm 3. The idea behind the algorithm is to
find, for each n = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . ,K, the value
T [n, k] of the best allocation for the problem having An =
{1, . . . , n} ⊆ A as ads set and Kk = {k, . . . ,K} ⊆ K
as slots set. The values of T [n, k] can be computed induc-
tively, noticing that the associated subproblems share the
same optimal substructure. As before, in Algorithm 3 we
only show how to find the value of the optimal allocation,
and not the allocation itself. Also, for the sake of simplicity,
the algorithm we present uses O(NK) memory, but we re-
mark that it is possible to bring the required memory down
to O(N +K) = O(N) while letting fast (i.e. O(NK) time)
reconstruction of the optimal allocation, using a technique
similar to that presented in (Hirschberg 1975). See the Ap-
pendix for further details.
Algorithm 3 SORTED–ADS
1: procedure SORTED-ADS(ads, slots, ≺ads)
2: Sort the ads according to≺ads, so that ad 1 is the minimum
ad w.r.t. the given order
. We now construct a memoization table T [n, k], reporting,
for each 1 ≤ n ≤ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the value of the best
allocation that uses only ads n, . . . , N and slots k, . . . ,K (i.e.
no ads get allocated to slots 1, . . . , k− 1 and λi = 1, ∀i < k).
3: T [N, k]← v¯N , k = 1, . . . ,K . Base case
4: for n = N − 1 downto 1 do
5: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
6: if k < K then
7: VALUE ← v¯n + λk cn T [n+ 1, k + 1]
8: T [n, k]← max{VALUE, T [n+ 1, k]}
9: else
10: T [n, k]← max{v¯n, T [n+ 1,K]}
11: return T [1, 1]
We end this subsection with the analysis of some eco-
nomical and theoretical properties of the algorithm. From
the economical standpoint, we note that, if the total orders
used do not depend on the reported types of the agents,
SORTED–ADS is maximal–in–its–range, leading thus to a
truthful mechanism when paired with VCG–like payments.
Furthermore, the resulting mechanism requires polynomial
time both for the allocation and the payments. From the the-
oretical standpoint, we remark that it is possible to prove
a 1/2 approximation ratio for the SORTED–ADS algorithm
in particular settings, e.g. when all the λ’s are constant (see
the Appendix ). The proof in the general case, though, is left
here as an open conjecture.
Experimental evaluation
For a better comparison of the results, we adopted the
same experimental setting used in (Gatti and Rocco
2013) and given to us by the authors. We briefly de-
scribe it, details can be found in the original paper. The
experimental setting is based on Yahoo! Webscope A3
dataset. Each bid is drawn from a truncated Gaussian
distribution, where the mean and standard deviation are
taken from the dataset, while quality is drawn from a
beta distribution. The values of λs of the first 10 slots
are {1.0, 0.71, 0.56, 0.53, 0.49, 0.47, 0.44, 0.44, 0.43, 0.43}.
We considered two scenarios, one having K = 5 and
one having K = 10. In both cases we let N ∈
{50, 60, . . . , 100} ∪ {200, 300, . . . , 1000}. For each pair
(K,N), 20 instances were generated. We implemented our
algorithms in the C++11 language and executed them on the
OSX 10.10.3 operating system. The main memory was a
16GB 1600MHz DDR3 RAM, while the processor was an
Intel Core i7–4850HQ CPU. We compiled the source with
GNU g++ version 4.9.1. Parallelization was achieved using
OpenMP version 4.0. Please refer to the Appendix for a
more thorough analysis and for the complete boxplot ver-
sion of the following plots.
DOMINATED–ADS algorithm
We study the average number of ads that survive
DOMINATED–ADS in Figure 1. The upper bounding strat-
egy needed in Lemma 14 was implemented using a O(NK)
time algorithm.
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A + B · logN
Figure 1: Average number of ads after running the
DOMINATED–ADS algorithm.
Notice that the number of removed ads already consider-
able whenN is small (e.g.,N ≈ 50), and that the prune ratio
increases dramatically as N grows (for instance, the prune
ratio is approximately 96% on average whenN = 1,000 and
K = 5). Experiments show that the number of surviving ads
is of the form N˜ = A + B · logN for suitable values2,3 of
A and B.
In Figure 2 we report the average running time for
DOMINATED–ADS. The graph shows that the running time
depends quadratically on the original problem size N , but it
remains negligible (around 20ms) even when N = 1,000.
50 60 70 80 90 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Number of ads in the original problem (N)
0.000
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0.008
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0.012
0.014
1.14 ·10−8 N2
Figure 2: Avg. DOMINATED–ADS run. time [s]. This is inde-
pendent of K and grows as ≈ 1.14 · 10−8N2 (R2 > 0.99).
COLORED–ADS algorithm
Figure 3 shows the average running time for COLORED–
ADS, implemented in its randomized version. The number of
iterations was set to eK log 2, i.e. 50% probability of finding
2For K = 5, we have A ≈ −6.1, B ≈ 5.9 and R2 > 0.98,
where R2 is the coefficient of determination of the fit.
3For K = 10, we have A ≈ −16.9, B ≈ 10.9 and R2 > 0.98.
the optimal allocation. The algorithm is run on the reduced
instances produced by DOMINATED–ADS. As a result of the
shrinking process, we point out that the running times for
N = 50 and N = 1,000 are comparable. We also remark
that, in order for COLORED–ADS to be applicable in real–
time contexts when K = 10, some sort of hardware scaling
is necessary, as a running time of≈ 0.5 seconds per instance
is likely to be too expensive for many practical applications.
When K = 5, though, no scaling is necessary, and the algo-
rithm proves to be extremely efficient.
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Figure 3: Avg. COLORED–ADS run. time [s] (eK log 2 runs).
SORTED–ADS algorithm
In figure 4 we study the approximation ratio of SORTED-
ADS. Optimal allocation values were computed using an
exponential branch–and–bound algorithm, similar to that
of (Gatti and Rocco 2013). For each shrunk problem
instance, we generated 2K3 random orders, and used
SORTED–ADS to approximate the optimal allocation. Sur-
prisingly, even though the number of iterations is relatively
low, approximation ratios prove to be very high, with values
> 97% in the worst case, with both medians and means al-
ways > 99%. Finally, in Figure 5 we report the correspond-
ing computation times. These prove to be in the order of a
handful of milliseconds, thus making SORTED–ADS suitable
in real-time contexts even for a large number of ads.
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Figure 4: Avg. SORTED–ADS approx. ratio (2K3 orders).
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Figure 5: Avg. SORTED–ADS running time [s] (2K3 orders).
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we provide several contributions about the
ad/position dependent cascade model for sponsored search
auctions. This model is commonly considered the one pro-
viding the best tradeoff between accuracy and computational
complexity, but no algorithm suitable for real–world ap-
plications is known. Initially, we study the inefficiency of
GSP and VCG with the only position dependent cascade
model w.r.t. the VCG with the ad/position dependent cas-
cade model, analyzing PoA and PoS both of the social wel-
fare and the auctioneer’s revenue. Our results show that the
inefficiency is in most cases unbounded and that the disper-
sion over the equilibria is extremely large, suggesting that
the GSP, as well as the VCG with position dependent cas-
cade model, presents severe limits. Subsequently, we pro-
vide three algorithms and we experimentally evaluate them
with a real–world dataset. Our first algorithm reduces the
size of the instances, discarding ads. Empirically, the num-
ber of non–discarded ads is logarithmic. Our second algo-
rithm finds the optimal allocation with high probability, re-
quiring a short time (less than 1ms when K = 5 even with
1,000 ads), but too long for real–time applications when
K = 10. Our third algorithm approximates the optimal allo-
cation in very short time (less than 5ms even with 1,000 ads)
providing very good approximations (>0.98). This shows
that the ad/dependent cascade model can be effectively used
in practice. Furthermore, we prove that our approximation
algorithm has a theoretical bound of 1/2 in restricted do-
mains and we leave open the proof that the bound holds in
general settings.
In future, we will extend our analysis and our algorithms
to models in which there is a contextual graph among the ad,
and in which there are multiple slates.
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Appendix
Inefficiency of GSP and VCG with PDC
GSP analysis
Lemma 1. The GSP is not IR, when users follow the APDC.
Proof. Consider a problem with N > K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = · · · = vN = 1,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = · · · = cN = 0,
• λ1 = · · · = λK−1 = 1.
In the GSP model, there exists an optimal allocation map-
ping ad 2 to slot 2. Therefore, agent 2 pays 1, but actu-
ally gains no value since all the c’s are equal to 0. Hence,
agent 2 has a negative payoff even though she is acting truth-
fully.
Lemma 2. The PoA of the social welfare in the GSP when
users follow APDC is unbounded.
Proof. Consider a problem with N = K = 2 having:
• v1 = ε, v2 = 1,
• q1 = q2 = 1,
• c1 = ε, c2 = 1− ε,
• λ1 = 1,
• vˆ1 = 1/ε, vˆ2 = ε2/2.
The utilities for the bidders are
u1 = v¯1 − q2vˆ2 = ε− ε2/2,
u2 = c1λ1v¯2 − 0 = ε.
Furthermore, the GSP allocates ad 1 before ad 2, with a so-
cial welfare of 2ε. The truthful strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium, as if bidder 1 made a bid < ε/2 her new utility
would be u′1 = ε − ε2 < u1; analogously, if bidder 2 made
a bid > 1, then her utility would be u′2 = 0 < u2. In the
VCG with APDC model, the optimal allocation has a social
welfare of 1 + ε(1− ε). Letting ε→ 0, we obtain a ratio of
2ε
1+ε(1−ε) → 0. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 3. The PoA of the social welfare in the GSP when
users follow APDC is ≥ K, in the restricted case the agents
do not overbid.
Proof. Consider a problem with N > K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = · · · = vN = 1,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = 0, c2 = · · · = cN = 1,
• λ1 = · · · = λK−1 = 1,
• vˆ1 = · · · = vˆN = 1.
The allocation mapping ad i to slot i for each i = 1, . . . ,K
is optimal for the GSP, resulting in a social welfare of 1.
Furthermore, the truthful strategy profile is a Nash equilib-
rium, since no agent would benefit from changing the re-
ported type to a lower value. On the other hand, every opti-
mal allocation for VCG with APDC allocates ad 1 in slotK,
thus resulting in a social welfare of K. This concludes the
proof.
Lemma 4. The PoA of the revenue in the GSP when users
follow APDC is unbounded (even without overbidding).
Proof. Consider a problem with N > K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = 1, v2 = · · · = vN = 1− ε,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = 0, c2 = · · · = cN = 1,
• λ1 = · · · = λK−1 = 1,
• vˆ1 = 1, vˆ2 = · · · = vˆN = 0.
The allocation mapping ad i to slot i for each i = 1, . . . ,K
is optimal for the GSP. The revenue of the auctioneer is 0,
each bidder been charged a payment of 0. The above strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium, as the first bidder obviously
has no incentive in decreasing its reported type, while each
other bidder can be allocated in the first slot only bidding a
value larger than or equal to 1, but this would lead a payment
1 > 1 − , generating thus a strictly negative utility. The
VCG with APDC admits an optimal allocation featuring ad
1 in the last slot (slot K). In this case, bidder 1 is charged
a payment 1 − ε, leading the auctioneer to have a strictly
positive revenue. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 5. The PoS of the social welfare in the GSP when
users follow APDC is 1 (even without overbidding).
Proof. Since the SW is calculated in the same way, indepen-
dently on the allocation function, the PoS of the SW is ≥ 1.
It is then sufficient to show that in at least one circumstance
the allocation of GSP and VCG with APDC coincide. To this
end, consider a problem with N > K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = · · · = vN = 1,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = · · · = cN = 1,
• λ1 = · · · = λK−1 = 1,
• vˆ1 = · · · = vˆN = 1.
It is easy to see that the allocation mapping ad i to slot i
for each i = 1, . . . ,K is optimal with both the mechanisms.
Furthermore, it is a Nash equilibrium, since no agent benefits
from misreporting her true type. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 6. The PoS of the revenue in the GSP when users
follow APDC is 0 (even without overbidding).
Proof. Consider a problem with N = K = 2 having:
• v1 = 1, v2 = 1/3,
• q1 = q2 = 1,
• c1 = 1, c2 = 1/2,
• λ1 = 1,
• vˆ1 = 1, vˆ2 = 1/3.
The GSP allocates ad 1 before ad 2, with a revenue of 1/3.
Notice that the above strategy profile constitutes a Nash
equilibrium, as bidder 1 can only decrease its utility from
2/3 to 1/2 when ad 1 is allocated below ad 2, while bidder 2
can only decrease her utility from 1/3 to−2/3 if ad 2 is allo-
cated in the first slot. While the APDC allocates ad 1 before
ad 2 as well, the revenue for the system is 0, since bidder 2 is
not charged any payment (not being subject to competition
for the second slot), and bidder 1 is charged v¯2−λ1c1v¯2 = 0.
This concludes the proof.
VCG with PDC analysis
Lemma 7. The VCG with PDC is neither IR nor DSIC,
when users follow APDC.
Proof. Consider a problem with N > K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = · · · = vN = 1,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = · · · = cN = 0,
• λ1 = · · · = λK = 1.
In the VCG with PDC, there exists an optimal allocation
mapping ad 2 to slot 2. Therefore, agent 2 pays 1, but actu-
ally she gains no value since all the c’s are equal to 0. Hence,
agent 2 has a negative payoff even though she bids truthfully
and the mechanism is not IR nor DSIC. This concludes the
proof.
Lemma 8. The PoA of the social welfare in the VCG with
PDC when users follow APDC is unbounded.
Proof. Consider a problem with N = K = 2 having:
• v1 = 0, v2 = 1,
• q1 = q2 = 1,
• c1 = 0, c2 = 1,
• λ1 = 1/2,
• vˆ1 = 4, vˆ2 = 0.
The utilities for the bidders are both 0 in the VCG with PDC
model. The VCG with PDC allocates ad 1 before ad 2, as
q1vˆ1 + λ1q2vˆ2 > q2vˆ2 + λ1q1vˆ1. The above strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium, as bidder 1 does not gain more by
reducing her bid, while, if bidder 2 made any bid > 4, her
utility would be v¯2 − (1 − λ)q1vˆ1 < 0. The social welfare
produced by the VCG with PDC is 0. On the other hand,
the VCG with APDC allocated ad 2 before ad 1, producing
a strictly positive social welfare. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 9. The PoA of the social welfare in the VCG with
PDC when users follow APDC is≥ K, in the restricted case
the agents do not overbid.
Proof. The same setting used in the proof of Lemma 3 ap-
plies here.
Lemma 10. The PoA of the revenue in the VCG with PDC
when users follow APDC is unbounded (even without over-
bidding).
Proof. Consider a problem with N = K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = · · · = vN = 1,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = · · · = cN = 1,
• λ1 = · · · = λK−1 = 1/2,
• vˆ1 = · · · = vˆN = 1.
Any allocation is optimal for the VCG with PDC, charging
each bidder a payment of zero. Furthermore, the above strat-
egy profile is a Nash equilibrium for the VCG with PDC,
since in any allocation the utility of each bidder is the same.
Thus, the revenue of the auctioneer with VCG with PDC is
0. On the other hand, in the VCG with APDC, all the bid-
ders except the one allocated in slot K are charged a strictly
positive payment. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 11. The PoS of the social welfare in the VCG with
PDC when users follow APDC is 1.
Proof. The same setting used in the proof of Lemma 5 ap-
plies here.
Lemma 12. The PoS of the revenue in the VCG with PDC
when users follow APDC is 0.
Proof. Consider a problem with N = K = 2 having:
• v1 = 1, v2 = 0,
• q1 = q2 = 1,
• c1 = 1, c2 = 1/2,
• λ1 = 1/2,
• vˆ1 = 1, vˆ2 = 1/2.
Both VCG with PDC and VCG with APDC allocate ad 1
before ad 2. With VCG with PDC, bidder 1 has a utility of
3/4, while bidder 2 has a utility of 0. Notice that the above
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the VCG with PDC:
if bidder 1 made a bid < 1/2, her utility would be 1/4; if
bidder 2made a bid > 1, her utility would be −1/2. The
revenue for VCG with PDC is 1/4, while that of VCG with
APDC is 0. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 13. The PoS of the revenue in the VCG with PDC
when users follow APDC is ≤ 1, in the restricted case the
agents do not overbid.
Proof. Consider a problem with N > K ≥ 2 having:
• v1 = · · · = vN = 1,
• q1 = · · · = qN = 1,
• c1 = · · · = cN = 1,
• λ1 = · · · = λK−1 = 1/2,
• vˆ1 = · · · = vˆN = 1.
Notice that the strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the VCG
with PDC, as no bidder can overbid, and no bidder bene-
fits from lowering her reported type. Furthermore, since all
the ad continuation probabilities are equal to 1, the revenues
of the two systems are equal, thus proving the lemma. This
concludes the proof.
DOMINATED–ADS algorithm
Lemma 14. Let λmax = max{λs : s ∈ K}, and B an
upper bound4 of the value of the optimal allocation; also,
let D = [0, λmax] × [0, B]. Given two ads a, b with pa-
rameters (v¯a, ca) and (v¯b, cb), consider the affine function
wa,b : D → R, defined as
wa,b(x, y) = det
(
x −y 1
1 v¯b cb
1 v¯a ca
)
If the minimum of wa,b overD is greater than 0, then a dom-
inates b.
4 More precisely, it is enough that B is a (weak) upper bound
of the quantity
B˜ = max
i
{λi · ALLOC(i+ 1,K)},
where ALLOC(i,K) is the value of the optimal allocation of the
problem having as slots the set Ki = {i, . . . ,K} ⊆ K.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we introduce a fictitious
slot, sayK+1, with λK = 0, representing the case in which
an ad is not displayed. By simple calculations, it can be ob-
served that, given an allocation θ and two allocated ads a, b
such that b is allocated above a (and a may be allocated in
slot K + 1), swapping a and b leads to an improvement of
the social welfare when the following condition holds:
va + caD + vbcaE > vb + cbD + vacbE
where:
• D =
∑
s∈{slotθ(b),...,slotθ(a)}
qadθ(s)vadθ(s)Cθ(adθ(s))Λs
Cθ(b)Λslotθ(b)
,
• E = Cθ(a)Λslotθ(a)
Cθ(b)Λslotθ(b)
.
Notice that both D and E do not depend on the parameters
(v, q, c) of a and b.
Ad a will be always swapped with ad b independently of
θ (i.e., independently of the slots in which they are allocated
and of how the other ads are allocated) and therefore ad a
dominates ad b, if the above inequality holds for every fea-
sible value of D and E. More precisely, D is lower bounded
by 0 and upper bounded by the value of the best allocation
(i.e., B), while E is lower bounded by 0 and upper bounded
by λmax. Rearranging the above inequality and replacing D
with y and E with x, we obtain:
x(vbca − vacb) + y(ca − cb) + va − vb = wa,b(x, y).
This concludes the proof.
CONST–λ algorithm
The idea behind the CONST–λ algorithm is that an upper
bound for ALLOC(k,K) is the optimal allocation of the
problem where all the λ values are replaced with λmax.
This value can be (exactly) computed in O(NK) time us-
ing SORTED-ADS, by sorting on decreasing v¯/(1− λmax c)
DECOUPLE algorithm
The idea behind the DECOUPLE algorithm is that
ALLOC(k,K) ≥ UBdecouple(k)
= v¯∗1 + v¯
∗
2 c
∗
1 λk + · · ·
+ v¯∗K−k+1 (c
∗
1 · · · c∗K−k) (λk · · ·λK−1)
where the v¯∗ values represent the v¯ values of the ads, or-
dered in decreasing order (i.e. v¯∗1 is the maximum among
all the v¯ values); same for the c∗ values. Notice that we can
easily compute v¯∗1 , . . . , v¯
∗
K inO(K logK+N) time using a
linear selection algorithm (e.g. introselect) and then sorting
the topmost K values with an efficient sort algorithm (the
same holds for the c∗ values).
In order to efficiently compute B˜, we need to com-
pute the values UBdecouple(1), . . . , UBdecouple(K) in time sub-
quadratic in K, as in the worst case K = N . We define
ak = v¯
∗
k (c
∗
1 · · · c∗k−1), bk = (λ1 · · ·λk−1).
In particular, a1 = v¯∗1 and b1 = 1. Notice that we can as-
sume without loss of generality that bk 6= 0, k = 1, . . . ,K.
We also let
ck = bk UBdecouple(k).
It is easy to prove that the vector c = (cK , . . . , c1) is
the (discrete) convolution of vectors a = (a1, . . . , aK) and
b = (bK , . . . , b1). Indeed, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}:
(a ∗ b)k =
k∑
i=1
ai bk−i+1 =
k∑
i=1
ai bK−k+i
=
k∑
i=1
v¯∗i (c
∗
1 · · · c∗i−1) (λ1 · · ·λK−k+i−1)
= bK−k+1UBdecouple(K − k + 1)
= cK−k+1
= ck.
This means that we can determine c in O(K logK) time
using the FFT algorithm (Cooley and Tukey 1965). Once we
have c, it’s trivial to compute UBdecouple(k) for k = 1, . . . ,K
inO(K) time. The final complexity for the algorithm is then
O(K logK +N).
Fast dominance computation
In order to show how to compute |dom(a)| for each ad a, we
begin with this simple lemma:
Lemma 19. For any fixed (x, y) ∈ D, the order ≺(x,y) over
the set of ads, defined as
a ≺(x,y) b ⇐⇒ wa,b(x, y) > 0,
is a total order5.
Proof. We have, by the properties of the determinant:
wa,b(x, y) = det
(
x −y 1
1 v¯b cb
1 v¯a ca
)
= det
(
x −y 1
1− cb x v¯b + cb y 0
1− ca x v¯a + ca y 0
)
= (1− cb x)(v¯a + ca y)− (1− ca x)(v¯b + cb y)
Hence, wa,b(x, y) > 0 if, and only if,
1− cb x
v¯b + cb y
>
1− ca x
v¯a + ca y
As we assumed x and y to be fixed parameters, we see
that ≺(x,y) defines a total order over the set of ads.
Lemma 19 and Lemma 15 together prove that the dom-
ination partial order, ≺, is the intersection of the four total
orders ≺(0,0), ≺(0,B), ≺(λmax,0) and ≺(λmax,B). This imme-
diately suggests the idea of working with ranks; in particu-
lar, we define ρ(x,y)(a) as the rank of ad a in the total order
≺(x,y), and introduce the 4–dimensional vector
rk(a) =
 ρ(0,0)(a)ρ(0,B)(a)ρ(λmax,0)(a)
ρ(λmax,B)(a)
 .
5We assume a deterministic tie-breaking condition is used to
handle the case when wa,b(x, y) = 0. Hence, from now on we
will assume without loss of generality that wa,b(x, y) 6= 0 for all
(x, y) ∈ D and a, b ∈ A
The condition of Lemma 15 is then equivalent to the fol-
lowing:
Lemma 20. Given two ads a and b, rk(a) < rk(b) iff a ≺ b.
Here < denotes component–wise comparison. Using
Lemma 20, we see that
dom(a) = {b ∈ A : rk(b) < rk(a)}
In other words, we can cast the problem of counting the
number of ads dominating a to a geometric dominance
counting problem in four dimensions. This problem is very
well-studied in the literature, with many results showing al-
gorithms computing dominance counts for every point in the
point set in O(N poly logN) time. For instance, we could
use a 4–dimensional range tree (Bentley 1979) to calculate
|dom(a)| for every ad a in batch in O(N log4N) time.
To lower the exponent of the log factor, we exploit the
structure of the problem a bit further. We define the two sets:
dom−(a) = {b ∈ A : b ≺ a ∧ cb ≤ ca}
dom+(a) = {b ∈ A : b ≺ a ∧ cb > ca}
It is trivial to verify that dom−(a)∪dom+(a) = dom(a) and
dom−(a) ∩ dom+(a) = ∅, i.e. that dom−(a) and dom+(a)
are a partition of dom(a). Hence,
|dom(a)| = |dom−(a)|+ |dom+(a)|.
Notice that
∂
∂y
wa,b(x, y) = ca − cb
This means that when cb ≤ ca, w(a,b)(x, y) ≥ w(a,b)(x, 0),
for all (x, y) ∈ D. Analogously, when cb > ca, we have
w(a,b)(x, y) ≥ w(a,b)(x,B) for all (x, y) ∈ D. Therefore, it
makes sense to introduce the following restricted ranks:
rk−(a) =
(
ρ(0,0)(a)
ρ(λmax,0)(a)
)
, rk+(a) =
(
ρ(0,B)(a)
ρ(λmax,B)(a)
)
We formalize the observation above in the next Lemma:
Lemma 21. Given two ads a and b:
• b ∈ dom−(a)⇐⇒ rk−(b) < rk−(a);
• b ∈ dom+(a)⇐⇒ rk+(b) < rk+(a).
Assume we have a data structure RT supporting each of
the following operations in O(logN) time:
• RT.INSERT(v) insert the 2-dimensional point v in the
structure; point v is not already present.
• RT.ERASE(v) deletes the 2-dimensional point v from the
structure; point v is guaranteed to be present. Further-
more, after the first call to SC.ERASE is made, the struc-
ture no longer accepts calls to DS.INSERT.
• RT.DOMINANCE(v) counts the number of points w in the
structure, satisfying w < v.
Such a data structure exists and is well-studied in the lit-
erature. It basically consists of a 2-dimensional range tree
combined with the technique of dynamic fractional cascad-
ing (Mehlhorn and Na¨her 1990).
The RT data structure can be used to compute |dom(a)|
for every ad a in batch in O(N logN) time, as streamlined
in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 FAST–DOMINATED–ADS
1: procedure FAST–DOMINATED–ADS(ads, slots)
2: Determine D, as defined in Lemma 14
3: RT+ ← new RT
4: RT− ← new RT
5: for each ad a ∈ A do
6: RT− .INSERT(rk−(a))
7: for each ad a ∈ A, sorted according to decreasing c, do
8: |dom+(a)| ← RT+ .DOMINANCE(rk+(a))
9: |dom−(a)| ← RT− .DOMINANCE(rk−(a))
10: |dom(a)| ← |dom+(a)|+ |dom−(a)|
11: RT+ .INSERT(rk+(a))
12: RT− .ERASE(rk−(a))
13: Discard all ads a having |dom(a)| > K
COLORED–ADS algorithm
Lemma 18. In at least one optimal allocation all the avail-
able slots are allocated.
Proof. Let θ be any optimal allocation for the problem at
hand. If it respects the condition of the lemma, the lemma is
trivially true. Otherwise, we show that it is possible to build
an optimal allocation θ∗ from θ, respecting the condition.
Let k∗ the maximum index of any empty slot of θ. If it is
the last slot, take any non allocated ad, and allocate it to k∗.
Such an ad must exist because we always assume N ≥ K.
As the value of the new allocation is not less than that of θ,
we conclude that the new allocation is optimal.
If, on the other hand, k∗ 6= K, we act as follows: we move
all the ads allocated in slots k∗+1 toK one slot ahead. This
operation does not decrease the value of the allocation, and
at the same time leaves slot K empty. We then operate as in
the previous case, filling slot K with any non allocated ad.
We repeat this algorithm until no slot is left vacant.
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SORTED–ADS algorithm
Space–efficient algorithm
We modify the idea in (Hirschberg 1975) to find a O(NK)
time, O(N) memory implementation of SORTED-ADS. In
particular, we need to show that there exists a O(NK) time
and O(N) memory algorithm able to find the least slot k∗,
respecting Definition 7.
Definition 7. Slot k is a split–point if there exists an optimal
allocation such that slots 1, . . . , k − 1 are occupied only by
ads ≤ N/2 and slots k, . . . ,K are occupied only by ads
> N/2.
Conceptually, we scan all the possible values of k, one
by one from 1 up until K until we find the first split–point.
Once a tentative value for k∗ has been chosen, it is enough
to test whether the best allocation satisfying the condition in
Definition 7 is an optimal allocation for the original prob-
lem. The split–point k breaks the optimal allocation fulfill-
ing the condition into two natural pieces: the first using only
ads in {1, . . . , N/2} and slots 1, . . . , k − 1, and the second
piece using ads in {N/2 + 1, . . . , N} and slots k, . . . ,K.
We let the social welfare of the first piece be W1, and that
of the second piece be W2; also, we let C1 be the product
of the continuation probabilities of the ads in the first piece.
The value of the optimal allocation satisfying the split–point
condition is therefore
SW = W1 + Λk−1 C1W2
Since by definition the allocation is optimal, the sec-
ond piece of the allocation must be itself an optimal allo-
cation for the problem having A = {N/2 + 1, . . . , N},
K = {k, . . . ,K}. Notice that we already know how to find
W2, for all the possible values of k, in O(NK) time and
O(N) memory. We can therefore treat W2 as a known con-
stant and focus on the problem of determining the alloca-
tion of the first piece maximizing SW. The crucial point is
that we can find the maximum of W1 for each k in dynamic
programming. Indeed, the objective function is the same we
would have in the allocation problem in which we have to
allocate ads {1, . . . , N/2} ∪ {X} in slots 1, . . . , kunder the
constraints:
• v¯X = W2 (notice that W2 is known, while the values
cX and λk can be disregarded not affecting the objective
function).
• Ad X must be allocated in slot k.
1
2–approximation ratio
Definition 8. Given a total order ≺ads, we define Θ≺ads as
the set of allocations θ where:
• for every a, a′ ∈ θ, slotθ(a) < slotθ(a′) only if a ≺ads a′
(notice that the constraint is only over the allocated ads,
each non–allocated ad may appear everywhere in ≺ads);
• there are no empty slots before an allocated slot.
Given a ≺ads, the set Θ≺ads constitutes the range of our allo-
cation algorithm.
Definition 9. We define θ∗≺ads as the optimal allocation (max-
imizing the social welfare) among all the allocations in
Θ≺ads .
Definition 10. We define θ∗ as the optimal allocation (max-
imizing the social welfare) among all the allocations in Θ
and≺∗ads as≺∗ads= {≺ads: θ∗≺ads = θ∗}.
Definition 11. We define ≺Nads as: for every a, a′ ∈ A,
a ≺Nads a′ if and only if va1−ca ≥
va′
1−ca′ (ties are broken lexi-
cographically).
When λk = 1 for every k, we have ≺Nads∈≺∗ads for every
value of the parameters as shown in (Kempe and Mahdian
2008).
Definition 12. We define ≺Rads as the reverse of ≺Nads.
We introduce a lemma that we use in our main result.
Lemma 22. When λk = 1 for every k, once A is restricted
to the ads appearing in θ∗ and the ads are labeled such that
a is the a–th ad in the allocation, then for every a we have:
va
1− ca ≥
K∑
b=a
vb
b−1∏
h=i
ch.
Proof. The proof is by mathematical induction.
Basis of the induction. The basis of the induction is for
slots k and k − 1. We need to prove that:
vk−1
1− ck−1 ≥ vk−1 + ck−1vk. (1)
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
vk−1
1− ck−1 ≥ vk,
that holds since
vk−1
1− ck−1 ≥
vk
1− ck
(by definition of ≺Nads) and
vk
1− ck ≥ vk
(by ck ∈ [0, 1]).
Inductive step. We assume that following inequality
holds
vi+1
1− ci+1 ≥
k∑
j=i+1
vj
j−1∏
h=i+1
ch,
and we want to prove
vai
1− cai
≥
k∑
j=i
vaj
j−1∏
h=i
cah . (2)
Equation (2) can be written as:
vi
1− ci ≥
k∑
j=i+1
vj
j−1∏
h=i+1
ch,
that holds since
vi
1− ci ≥
vi+1
1− ci+1
(by definition of ≺Nads) and
vi+1
1− ci+1 ≥
k∑
j=i+1
vj
j−1∏
h=i+1
ch
(by assumption of the inductive step). This completes the
proof.
We use the above lemma to derive the bound.
Theorem 1. When λk = 1 for every k, we have
r =
SW(θ∗≺ads)
SW(θ∗)
≥ 1
2
for every ≺ads.
Proof. For the sake of presentation, we split the proof in
several parts.
Ads ranking. Among all the possible ≺ads, we can safely
focus only on ≺Rads given that this order is the worst for
our problem. This property follows from the results dis-
cussed in (Kempe and Mahdian 2008). More precisely, the
authors show that, given any allocation θ, for every a, a′ if
slotθ(a) < slotθ(a′) and va1−ca >
va′
1−ca′ then switching a
with a′ never reduces the value of the allocation. Therefore,
the social welfare with ≺Rads is the minimum w.r.t. that one
with all the ≺ads. (Interestingly, when ≺ads 6∈≺∗ads, θ∗≺ads may
prescribe that the number of allocated ads is strictly smaller
than the number of ads allocated in θ∗.)
Allocations set. Given ≺Rads, we use a lower bound over
the value θ∗≺Rads
focusing only on a specific subset of alloca-
tions defined below. This subset may not contain the opti-
mal allocation θ∗≺Rads
and therefore we obtain a lower bound
for r that may be not tight. However, in the following, we
complete the result showing that the bound is tight. The al-
locations we focus on are of the form: 〈z, z − 1, . . . , 1〉 with
z ∈ {1, . . . ,K} where the ads are indexed on the basis on
≺Nads (i.e., 1 ≺Nads 2 ≺Nads . . .). We study the value of r for
each possible value of z under the constraints that, given z,
it holds:
z∑
i=1
vi z∏
j=i+1
cj
 ≥ z+1∑
i=1
vi z+1∏
j=i+1
cj
 (3)
z∑
i=1
vi z∏
j=i+1
cj
 ≥ h∑
i=1
vi h∏
j=i+1
cj
 ∀h : 1 ≤ h < z
(4)
with the exception that when z = k, only Constraints (4) are
required. We notice that, for every auction instance, there
always exists a value of z such that the above constraints
hold. This value can be found by starting from z = 1 and
increasing it until the constraints hold.
Ratio. Once z is fixed, a lower bound over r can be ob-
tained by using the following upper bound over the value of
θ∗: we compute θ∗ as if k = n. Thus, the ratio r is:
r ≥
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
n∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
) .
Bound with z = 1. In this case, we have:
z = 1
v1 ≥ v2 + c2v1 (5)
r ≥ v1
n∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
) (6)
by applying Lemma 22, we can write r as:
r ≥ v1
n∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
) ≥ v1
v1 + c1
v2
1− c2
,
by using Equation (5) we have:
r ≥ v1
v1 + c1
v2
1− c2
≥ v1
v1 + c1v1
.
The minimization of v1v1+c1v1 can be achieved by maximiz-
ing c1 (i.e., when c1 = 1), obtaining r ≥ 12 .
Bound with k > z > 1. In this case, we can write r as:
r ≥
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
n∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
=
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
n∑
i=z+1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=z+1
cj
) ,
by applying Lemma 22, we have:
r ≥
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
n∑
i=z+1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=z+1
cj
)
≥
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
vz+1
1− cz+1
,
by using Equation (3) we have:
r ≥
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
vz+1
1− cz+1
≥
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
) .
We derive r w.r.t. vz and we show that the derivative is al-
ways positive:
∂r
∂vz
=
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
−
z−1∏
j=1
cj
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
(
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
))2
=
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
(
1−
z−1∏
j=i
cj
z∏
j=i+1
cj
))
(
z∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z∏
j=1
cj
z∑
i=1
(
vi
z∏
j=i+1
cj
))2
≥ 0,
given that
(
1−
z−1∏
j=i
cj
z∏
j=i+1
cj
)
≥ 0. Thus, we minimize
r by minimizing vz . Due to Constraint (4) with h = z − 1,
the minimum feasible value of vz is:
vz = (1− cz)
z−1∑
i=1
vi z−1∏
j=i+1
cj
 ,
substituting vz in r we have:
r ≥
z−1∑
i=1
(
vi
z−1∏
j=i+1
cj
)
z−1∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
)
+
z−1∏
j=1
cj
z−1∑
i=1
(
vi
z−1∏
j=i+1
cj
) .
By applying iteratively the above steps for vh with h from
h = z − 2 to h = 2, we obtain the same bound of the case
with z = 1:
r ≥ v1
v1 + c1v1
≥ 1
2
.
Bound with z = k. Differently from the previous cases,
here we do not use an upper bound over θ∗, but the exact
value, and for the lower bound over θ∗≺Rads
we consider only
the ads appearing in θ∗. In this case, we have:
r ≥
k∑
i=1
(
vi
k∏
j=i+1
cj
)
k∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
) ,
we derive r w.r.t. vk, obtaining:
∂r
∂vk
=
k∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
(
1−
k−1∏
j=i
cj
k∏
j=i+1
cj
))
(
k∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
))2
≥ 0,
we minimize r by minimizing vk as:
vk = (1− ck)
k−1∑
i=1
vi k−1∏
j=i+1
cj
 ,
obtaining:
r ≥
k−1∑
i=1
(
vi
k−1∏
j=i+1
cj
)
k−1∑
i=1
(
vi
i−1∏
j=1
cj
(
1 + (1− ck)ci
k−1∏
j=i+1
c2j
)) .
By applying iteratively the above steps for vh with h from
h = k− 2 to h = 2—the derivative is always positive—, we
obtain:
r ≥ v1
v1 + v1c1
(
1−
k∏
i=2
cj
) = 1
1 + c1
(
1−
k∏
i=2
cj
) ,
r is minimized when c1 = 1 and
k∏
i=2
cj = 0, obtaining
r ≥ 1
2
.
The extension of the above result to the case in which
λk = λ for every k is straightforward. Indeed, it is sufficient
to observe that in this case we can redefine the continuation
probabilities as c′i = ciλ for every i and subsequently rede-
fine λk = 1 for every k.
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Experimental evaluation
We prove the statistical significance of the experimental re-
sults in the following boxplots. We follow the structure of
the paper.
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